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Introduction 
 
Feminist research on judging has asked questions such as: How do judges construct gender 
and sexuality? Do women judges make a difference, and if so how? Do feminist judges make 
a difference and if so how? Can we identify particular techniques or strategies of feminist 
judging? Can feminist theory be incorporated into judicial reasoning and if so, to what 
extent?  Like much mainstream legal research, this kind of feminist research uses judgments 
as its primary source, but unlike mainstream legal research, it considers and analyses 
judgments in a variety of different ways. This article begins by describing the uses of 
judgments as sources within feminist research on judging, and then outlines three different 
methods of analysis employed within this research: quantitative analysis, qualitative 
analysis, and the newest method, that of rewriting judgments. 
 
Judgments as Sources 
 
Mainstream legal research tends to focus on individual judgments on a particular topic, and 
engages in doctrinal analysis, considering how the judgment deals with the facts of the case 
and how it fits with, extends or departs from existing legal doctrine on the relevant topic.  
Feminist researchers also engage in this type of analysis, but in addition, in thinking about 
how judges construct gender and sexuality, they employ discourse analysis rather than 
doctrinal analysis in reading judgments.  Discourse analysis involves paying close, critical 
attention to the judicial reasoning, including the language and concepts used, the way the 
argument is constructed, and what might be absent from or excluded by the text. The aim is 
to identify what understanding/s of gender and/or sexuality are invoked or constructed by 
the judgment, to place the judgment within the context of wider legal and non-legal 
discourses around gender and sexuality, and to consider the potential socio-legal effects of 
the judgment. 
 
As well as analysing individual judgments, some feminist researchers have been concerned 
with collective judgments – such as, for example, the collective work of a particular court, or 
of a particular judge, over a period of time. Considering judgments on this scale provides a 
more systematic way of answering questions about whether women judges or feminist 
judges make a difference.  In the following section I give some specific examples of uses of 
collective judgments, before returning to individual judgments in the context of feminist 
judgment projects. 
 
Methods for Analysing Judgments 
 
Quantitative methods – Within the political science discipline in the USA, there have been a 
number of studies which have sought to determine whether women judges make a 
difference by reference to large-scale datasets of judgments. These studies seek to 
determine whether there is any statistically significant correlation between the outcome of 
the case or the vote cast by a judge on an appellate panel and the judge’s gender, or 
whether the presence of a woman or women judges on an appellate panel makes any 
difference to outcomes. Further, by means of regression analysis, they seek to determine 
whether gender remains statistically significant when other potential explanatory variables 
(such as the judge’s years of experience and political affiliation) are taken into account.  The 
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results of these studies have been mixed, with some finding no gender differences,1 while 
others have found gender differences in relation to particular issues such as employment 
discrimination (particularly sex discrimination and sexual harassment), obscenity and private 
economic matters.2 In criminal law, studies have found women judges to be harsher 
sentencers and more conservative than male judges in relation to crime,3 but more liberal 
than male judges in death penalty cases (Songer and Crews-Meyer 2000).4  As well as the 
subject-matter examined, the results achieved are also influenced by the forms of 
measurement adopted.5 
 
My own research has included a study of the judgments of a particular judge, Justice Marcia 
Neave, during her first three years on the Court of Appeal in the Australian State of 
Victoria.6 Before her appointment, Justice Neave had had a career as a feminist academic 
and law reform commissioner, so I was interested to see how she acted as a judge. My 
statistical analysis included the number of cases on which she sat (204), the types of cases 
(60 per cent criminal/sentencing appeals), the types of judgments she delivered (leading 
judgment: 28 per cent; agreement with the leading judgment: 36 per cent; joint judgment: 
17 per cent) and her dissent rate (a very low 3 per cent). I also attempted to identify the 
proportion of cases on which she sat which raised any kind of gender or feminist issue, and 
found only around one third of her cases did so, most of which were criminal or sentencing 
appeals. She gave the leading judgment in 36 per cent of these cases, higher than her 
overall percentage of leading judgments, indicating that she chose to write or was assigned 
the leading judgment in at least some of the cases due to her particular interest or 
expertise. She was also more likely to write a concurring judgment in such cases – 15 per 
cent compared to 8 per cent overall – often to express a particular feminist perspective. 
 
Currently, Erika Rackley and I are undertaking a similar systematic analysis of Lady Hale’s 
judgments on the UK Supreme Court, asking similar questions, but also comparing Hale’s 
statistical profile with those of her judicial colleagues. To date, we have analysed cases from 
the court’s inception in October 2009 until July 2014 (326 cases). We have found a lower 
proportion of cases raising gender or feminist issues – only 26 per cent – but Lady Hale is 
significantly more likely to sit on those cases than she is to sit on cases which do not raise 
such issues. Unlike the Victorian Court of Appeal, the UK Supreme Court’s caseload is much 
more heavily weighted towards civil law, and thus the feminist/gender issues arise in areas 
such as family law, immigration law, human rights law, housing law and employment law. 
 
Qualitative methods – But a quantitative analysis of judgments can only take you so far. In 
particular, quantitative analyses focus on the outcomes of cases (finding for the plaintiff or 
defendant, upholding or dismissing the appeal, or in sentencing cases, the type and duration 
of sentence imposed). But the feminist literature suggests that women or feminist judges 
may reason as well as decide differently. Indeed, as indicated above in relation to Justice 
Neave’s concurrences – they may reach the same result as the other members of the court 
but for different reasons.7 In my study of Justice Neave’s judgments, therefore, in addition 
to the quantitative analysis, I undertook a qualitative analysis of her opinions in the cases 
raising feminist or gender issues, in order to see whether her reasoning in these cases was 
different from those of her male and other female colleagues.  I found there to be much 
more notable differences than the quantitative study alone might have suggested.  
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The most typical way in which Justice Neave ‘made a difference’ was in making generalised 
statements which brought previously excluded social experiences of sexual offences and 
domestic violence into legal discourse, to expand and transform law’s ‘common knowledge’ 
about the world. In doing so, she challenged gender stereotypes and assumptions about 
how victims ought to behave. This was not a feature of the judgments of any of her judicial 
colleagues, male or female. In other cases, Justice Neave contextualised the issues in the 
case in a way that her judicial colleagues did not, both in terms of explaining the policy 
context of legislation, and paying attention to the particular circumstances of the individual 
parties. As indicated above, she arrived at the same result as her colleagues in the vast 
majority of cases. But in a number of these her different reasoning made an important 
contribution to the law’s ability to understand the full variety of human experience. In our 
study of Lady Hale’s judgments, we are proposing to follow a similar method to analyse 
reasoning as well as results. 
 
Another example of qualitative analysis of a body of judgments is Kylie Burns’ study of the 
use of ‘social facts’ by the High Court of Australia in negligence cases.8  ‘Social facts’ are 
“general statements about the nature and behaviour of people and institutions and the 
nature of the world and society”9 which may be referred to in the course of judicial 
reasoning. Burns undertook a systematic content analysis of 45 Australian High Court 
negligence cases from 2001-2005. She found that social facts were used in these cases for 
purposes including “predicting social, economic and behavioural consequences of legal 
rules”,10 setting the context or background to the case, or as an aid to evaluating facts in 
issue. Although they were not a major feature of the cases studied, they did play a 
significant role in certain complex and important cases. Interestingly, most statements of 
social fact “were not sourced or referenced in any way”,11 but were taken as ‘common 
knowledge’ by the judges who made them. Burns raises concerns about “potential dangers 
[for the] accuracy and legitimacy of judicial decision-making”.12 The ‘social facts’ enunciated 
by an all-male court might, for example, differ markedly from the ‘feminist common 
knowledge’ set forth in Justice Neave’s judgments. 
 
A further example of this kind of approach is a study I am currently undertaking with 
Danielle Tyson at Monash University in Australia. In 2005 the State of Victoria abolished 
provocation as a defence to homicide. One of the concerns raised at the time, however, was 
that the kind of reasoning which had underpinned the provocation defence – that a 
woman’s infidelity or even threats to leave a relationship were sufficient to provoke her 
male partner to lose self-control and kill her – would reappear as a mitigating factor at the 
sentencing stage, resulting in more lenient sentences for men who killed their intimate 
partners or ex-partners. We are thus examining all of the post-provocation sentencing 
judgments in such cases, to determine whether this is in fact occurring. Again, we are 
undertaking a content analysis of these judgments, identifying and analysing judicial 
statements about provocation, domestic violence, men’s anger, women’s behaviour, the 
influence of drugs and alcohol, culture and psychological factors. Although the analysis is at 
a relatively early stage, we have identified one judge, Justice Betty King, whose sentencing 
judgments stand out from those of both her male and female colleagues in upholding the 
spirit of the abolition and reinforcing its rationale.  
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Rewriting judgments – The third and relatively newly invented method of analysing 
judgments can be seen in a series of feminist judgment projects, beginning with the 
Women’s Court of Canada.  The Women’s Court was founded by a group of feminist lawyers 
and academics who were involved in the Canadian Women’s Legal Education and Action 
Fund (LEAF). LEAF had written a number of amicus briefs in cases before the Canadian 
Supreme Court dealing with s.15 – the equality clause – of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. Although the Court had been responsive to LEAF’s arguments in earlier 
cases, there was a feeling it had stopped listening, and that its equality jurisprudence was 
going backwards. In thinking about how to regain the Court’s attention, they came up with 
the idea of rewriting the judgments in leading s.15 cases, to demonstrate what their 
arguments in favour of a more substantive conception of equality would look like in 
practice.13 The first six judgments of the Women’s Court of Canada were published in the 
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law in 2008.14 
 
The Women’s Court of Canada was followed in 2008-10 by the UK Feminist Judgments 
Project. Rather than confining itself to a specific area of jurisprudence, the UK project 
invited participants to rewrite judgments across the whole range of English law. A book 
containing 23 rewritten judgments, with accompanying explanatory commentaries, was 
published in 2010.15 Subsequently, feminist judgment projects have been launched in 
Australia,16 Ireland (including Northern Ireland)17 and the United States,18 and there is also a 
feminist international judgments project beginning work, with the aim of rewriting 
judgments from a range of international courts and tribunals.19  One particular international 
court – the European Court of Human Rights – has been the subject of a separate project 
which rewrote a number of the court’s judgments in cases involving women’s, children’s 
and minority rights,20 and a further Children’s Rights Judgments Project is also under way. 
 
The aims of the various feminist judgment projects are similar. In light of the fact that the 
higher judiciary in all common law countries remains significantly male-dominated, the 
projects imagine the ‘missing’ feminist judges who might have been on the relevant court, 
and the judgments they might have written. In doing so, they have put feminist theory into 
practice in the form of legally plausible judgments, and explored the scope for (and 
limitations of) doing so. By working within the law at the time of the original judgment, with 
the material available to the original judges, and using standard techniques of legal 
reasoning, the re-written judgments demonstrate powerfully the contingency of the original 
decisions. They show that even at the same time and subject to the same constraints as the 
original decision-makers, the judgments could have been reasoned and/or decided 
differently. 
 
In fact, two different methods of rewriting judgments have already developed. The first 
involves writing an entire judgment, which is intended either to substitute for the original 
(in the case of a first instance decision) or to be an additional opinion in an appellate case, 
or to be the decision made by a fictional court hearing an appeal or review of the original 
decision.  Where the opinion is that of an additional judge, it may be a concurrence – which 
agrees with the original result, but for different reasons – or a dissent, which would have 
reached a different result from the original court or majority. A further example of this type 
of alternative judgment is that written by Madhumanti Mukherjee in the Indian Supreme 
Court Case of Sakshi v Union of India. This case concerned the definition of rape in the 
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Indian Penal Code, and Mukherjee argues that women were not treated as legal person 
under the law. Her feminist judgment seeks to demonstrate how the case would have been 
decided if women were considered to be legal persons, with a different result from that 
reached in the original case.21 
 
The second method involves a more limited editing of the original judgment rather than 
writing an entirely new one.  Within this method, the original judgment is left largely intact, 
but particular paragraphs, lines and words may be added, deleted or amended, showing 
how, with some revision, the judgment could be strengthened or redirected. This was the 
method used in the European Human Rights Project, and was also the method adopted by 
Tamara Hervey in a book chapter titled ‘Re-judging Social Right in the European Union’, in 
which she undertakes an imaginative, partial rewriting of the Kohll case,22 a case on free 
movement of cross-border patients, to demonstrate how EU social rights – specifically the 
‘right to health care’ – could be made central to judicial reasoning.23 
 
Conclusion 
 
While doctrinal and discursive analysis of individual judgments, and large-scale quantitative 
analysis of court decisions, are well established methods, the use of judgments as sources, 
either collectively or individually, to answer other kinds of questions about the way law 
operates is relatively under-developed. The combination of quantitative and qualitative 
analysis of the oeuvre of individual judges, content analysis of particular bodies of 
jurisprudence, and the emerging methods of rewriting judgments, open up a world of 
possibilities to be explored. I hope this article gives some taste of the possibilities and might 
inspire and encourage other socio-legal scholars to pursue them. 
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